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EXIT POLLING STATUTE DOESN'T MEASURE UP
TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Exit polling provides the media with information which can be used
to project election results before the final tally.' The media also uses the
data for post-election reports concerning voting behavior and trends.
For example, exit poll reports may discuss why voters are more apt to
vote for a particular presidential candidate, or if the vice-presidential
candidate influenced their vote.
In the past decade, both state and federal legislatures have debated
the use of exit polls. Congress has yet to prohibit or limit exit polling.
Nevertheless, some state legislatures have charged that exit polls have
dissuaded some potential voters in the western states, Hawaii, and
Alaska from casting their ballots in 1980 and 1984.2
After the 1980 election, in response to the National Broadcasting
Company's ("NBC") early prediction that Ronald Reagan had won,
some state legislatures enacted statutes prohibiting exit polls.3 In 1983,
Washington's state legislature, fearing election exit poll impact on voting
behavior, amended Washington Revised Code section 29.51.020 to pro-
hibit any exit polls or public opinion poll within the prohibitory activity
area of voters on the day of any election.4 This statute extended the pro-
hibitory activity area, the area in which exit polls could not be con-
1. Judge Tanner of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton described the practice of exit polling as follows: "Plaintiffs ABC, CBS, NBC, and the New
York Times conduct their questioning of voters leaving polling places in a systematic and
statistically reliable manner. They do so by requesting certain voters, as they leave a polling
place, voluntarily to complete a short questionnaire. The voters asked to complete questionna-
ries are chosen on the basis of a predetermined numerical sequence." Brief of Appellees at 16,
Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1984) (No. 86-3641) ("Daily Herald I").
2. Walters, Peacocks Night to Crow, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1980, at 82 (1980).
3. Id.
4. The amended statute states in its entirety:
(1) On the day of any primary, general, or special election, no person may, within a
polling place, or in any public area within three hundred feet of such polling
place:
(a) Do any electioneering;
(b) Circulate cards or handbills of any kind;
(c) Solicit signatures to any kind of petition;
(d) Engage in any practice which interferes with the freedom of voters to exer-
cise their franchise or disrupts the administration of the polling place; or
(e) Conduct any exit polls or public opinion poll with voters.
(2) No person may obstruct the doors or entries to a building in which a polling
place is located or prevent free access to and from any polling place. Any Sheriff,
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ducted, from one hundred feet to three hundred feet from the polling
places.5
The statute was immediately challenged by the Daily Herald Com-
pany ("Daily Herald"), American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
("ABC"), Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. ("CBS"), National
Broadcasting Company, and the New York Times Company ("Times")
(collectively hereinafter the "Media Plaintiffs") in Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro ("Daily Herald I").' The Media Plaintiffs alleged that Washing-
ton's restriction on exit polling violated the first amendment by re-
straining free speech.7 In early 1988, on a second appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Media Plaintiffs, holding
the statute unconstitutional.'
This casenote analyzes the decisions in Daily Herald I and Daily
Herald II in light of past Supreme Court decisions. In the wake of these
decisions, this casenote concludes that the Daily Herald II court cor-
rectly decided that the Washington statute was unconstitutional. It fur-
ther suggests that both Congress and the state legislatures should abstain
from imposing restrictions on exit polls until the first amendment right of
newsgatherers are guaranteed. It concludes that legislatures should at-
tempt to pass uniform poll closing times across the country to dissipate
any impact exit polls might have on voting behavior in the western states.
II. THE HISTORY OF DAILY HERALD V MUNRO
Daily Herald I
In December 1983, the Daily Herald, ABC, CBS, NBC, and the
Times filed an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, against Ralph
deputy sheriff, or municipal law enforcement officer shall prevent such obstruc-
tion, and may arrest any person creating such obstruction.
(3) No person may:
(a) Except as provided in RCW 29.34.157, remove any ballot from the polling
place before the closing of the polls, or
(b) Solicit any voter to show his or her ballot.
(4) No person other than an inspector or judge of election may receive from any
voter a voted ballot or deliver a blank ballot to such elector.
(5) Any violation of this section is a misdemeanor under RCW 9A.20.010, and shall
be punished under RCW 9A.20.020(3), and the person convicted may be ordered
to pay the costs of the prosecution.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.51.020 (West Supp. 1984-85).
5. A violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 29.51.020(5) (West Supp. 1984-85).
6. Since the district court did not publish its opinion, this casenote refers to both the
Daily Herald I court and the Daily Herald II court for factual support.
7. Daily Herald 1, 758 F.2d at 353.
8. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 388 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Daily Herald II").
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Munro, the Secretary of State of Washington, and Ken 0. Eikenberry,
the Attorney General of Washington, as defendants in their capacities as
state officers.9 As Secretary of State, Munro was the chief election officer
of Washington.' ° As Attorney General, Eikenberry was charged with
enforcing the criminal laws of the state."
The Media Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief from the United
States District Court in Tacoma alleging that the statutory ban against
exit polls within a three hundred foot zone surrounding polling places
violated the first and fourteenth amendments.' 2 Further, the Media
Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction restraining enforcement of the
statute.'
3
The State counterclaimed for an injunction to prevent the Media
Plaintiffs from violating the statute, alleging that exit polling infringed
upon voters' rights by disturbing the peace, order, and decorum of pol-
ling places. ' In addition, defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' conduct
discouraged voting and violated the statutory limitations on exit
polling.' 5
Shortly thereafter, the Media Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment on which Judge Tanner decided that there were no genuine
issues of material fact in controversy between the parties. 6 Judge Tan-
ner held: (1) the statute incidentally restricted the plaintiffs' expressive
activities and inconvenienced the plaintiffs' ability to gather news; (2) the
State of Washington had a legitimate and compelling interest in main-
taining peace, order and decorum in and around the election polling
places, to protect the citizens' fundamental right to vote; and (3) the
State had met its burden of showing that the statute was the least restric-
tive way of carrying out the legitimate State interest. '
7
The Media Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.' 8 Again, the plaintiffs argued that the statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the first and fourteenth
amendments. 19
9. Daily Herald I, 758 F.2d at 353.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Daily Herald I, 838 F.2d at 383.
13. Daily Herald ! 758 F.2d at 353.
14. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 383.
15. Id.
16. Daily Herald I 758 F.2d at 354.
17. Id.
18. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 383.
19. Id. at 382.
1989]
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The parties disagreed about the actual purpose of the statute. The
Media Plaintiffs argued that the amended statute's predominant purpose
was to inhibit the broadcast of election projections.2" They contended
that purpose was achieved by extending the prohibitory area to three
hundred feet, thereby denying the Media Plaintiffs any practical method
of conducting accurate exit polls.21
However, the State contended the statute was intended to preserve
peace, order and decorum at the polling places or, in the alternative, to
protect the State's interest in preventing adverse effect on voter turn-
out.22 The State contended that election day projections "cause a de-
crease in the numbers of people voting."23
Judges Farris and Alarcon, writing for the majority of the court,
neither discussed the purpose of the statute nor its first and fourteenth
amendment implications. They remanded the case to the district court,
ruling that triable issues of fact existed.24
In a separate opinion, Judge Norris, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, expressed his views about the case. Judge Norris agreed with
the majority's decision to vacate the summary judgment.25 However, he
believed the majority created a "laundry list" of disputed issues to be
resolved by the district court.2 6 Judge Norris believed the constitutional
question was whether the Washington statute, "banning all exit polling
within 300 feet of the polling place, whether or not disruptive, is uncon-
stitutional because it is not the 'least restrictive means available' to pre-
serve order at the polling place."27 Judge Norris found that the available
means depended on whether the ends the statute purported to achieve
were constitutional.28
Contrary to the State's contention that the purpose of the statute
was to preserve peace, order, and decorum at the polls, Judge Norris
concluded that the true purpose of the statute was to prevent early elec-
tion predictions rather than to preserve peace at the polls. 29 Hence, he
stated that the statute was in violation of the first amendment right of the
media to gather and disseminate news, since the statute was not sup-
20. Id. at 386.
21. Daily Herald 1, 758 F.2d at 362.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 352.
25. Id.
26. Daily Herald I, 758 F.2d at 352.
27. Id. at 354.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 358.
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ported by a compelling state interest and was not the least restrictive
means available to accomplish the legislative purpose.3"
Judge Norris, quoting from Police Department Of Chicago v. Mos-
ley, 31 stated that first amendment protections mandate that "government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter or its content.",32 Consequently, the government may not
restrict collecting and broadcasting information about the political pro-
cess because of concern about the impact on voter behavior.33 Judge
Norris' opinion, if adopted by the majority, would have concluded the
controversy in favor of the Media Plaintiffs.
Daily Herald H
On remand, the judge who had previously ruled the statute constitu-
tional, decided that the State had presented no evidence that the exit
polling was disruptive or discouraged voters from casting their ballots.34
He further found that
the media plaintiffs conducted their exit polls in a "systematic
and statistically reliable manner"; that information obtained
from exit polling could not be obtained by other methods; that
the 300-foot limit precluded exit polling; and that exit polling
was not per se disruptive to the polling place.3 5
The State of Washington appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, arguing that the district court erred in holding that the statute
was not the least restrictive means of advancing the state's interest.36 In
February 1988, the court of appeals upheld the district court's decision.37
The appellate court held that exit polling was protected by the first
amendment; the statute was a content-based prohibition on speech in a
public forum; the statute was not narrowly tailored to accomplish a com-
pelling government interest and was not the least restrictive means avail-
able to accomplish the government's goal.38
Judge Reinhardt's concurring opinion emphasized that public de-
bate is the paramount principle underlying the first amendment. 39 He
30. Id. at 360.
31. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
32. Id. at 96.
33. Daily Herald , 758 F.2d at 362.
34. Daily Herald I, 838 F.2d at 383.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 388-89.
38. Id. at 388.
39. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 389.
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stressed that the statute's restriction on the media's right of access to
crucial information, violated the principles embodied in the first amend-
ment.' Judge Reinhardt distinguished the public forum approach used
by Justice Ferguson in his majority opinion from the public debate ap-
proach.4 He found the statute violated the first amendment under both
approaches.42
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
Is Newsgathering Protected by the First Amendment?
The initial issue in the case was whether newsgathering is a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right.43 The State in Daily Herald I argued that
newsgathering is not protected by the first amendment because the
Washington statute only prohibited the gathering of news, not its
dissemination."
However, the court held that the State's contention was unfounded
because newsgathering, similar to news dissemination, is protected by the
first amendment.45
There is ample authority to support the court's position. In
Branzburg v. Hayes,46 the United States Supreme Court held that news-
gathering is entitled to first amendment protection, for "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated."47 The Court held that requiring newsmen to testify before
grand juries concerning information obtained from confidential sources
does not violate the first amendment.48
In the landmark case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,49
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Stevens expressly in-
voked the "right to gather information"5 doctrine.5 ' The Richmond
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 389. The Media Plaintiffs admitted that their conduct violated the statute
prohibiting exit polls within three hundred feet of a polling place.
44. Brief for Appellants at 39, Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
45. Daily Herald , 758 F.2d at 359. See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir. 1978); In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
47. Id. at 681.
48. Id. at 682.
49. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
50. According to Professor Nimmer, the right to gather information doctrine should be
distinguished from the right of access. The right to gather information doctrine is only the
right to seek out information from its source. The right to access is the right to communicate
information through existing means of communication controlled by others after the informa-
[Vol. 9
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Court held that the first amendment guarantees the public and the press
the right to attend criminal trials.5 2 The Richmond Court qualified its
holding by stating, "our holding today does not mean that the First
Amendment rights of the public and representatives of the press are
absolute. '" 3
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,5 4 the United States
Supreme Court applied the principle espoused in Richmond. The Court
in Globe Newspaper held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute which
required exclusion of the press and the public during the testimony of a
minor in a sex-offense trial." According to Professor Nimmer, access to
the courtroom is "but a subset of the general right to gather information
recognized in Richmond."56
The Globe Newspaper Court held that the first amendment includes
"those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated, are nonetheless
necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights. Underly-
ing the first amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common
understanding that a major purpose of that amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs."5 7
From the decisions in Branzburg, Richmond, and Globe Newspaper
the Supreme Court has made it clear that the right of access is fundamen-
tally necessary to the right to gather information. In Daily Herald the
issue was whether the Washington statute infringed upon the right to
gather information when the statute regulated the type of newsgathering
activities that journalists may engage in while within the three hundred
foot zone surrounding the polling places.58
Exit Polls and Traditional Public Forum Analysis
In determining the constitutionality of a speech regulation, the
courts apply different levels of scrutiny depending on whether the regu-
lated speech occurred in a traditional public forum or a private forum
and whether the statute is content-based or content-neutral. 59 A content-
tion has been gathered. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 4.09[B], at 4-42
(1985) [hereinafter NIMMER].
51. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 564.
52. Id. at 580.
53. Id. at 581 n.18.
54. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
55. Id. at 604.
56. NIMMER, supra note 50, § 4.09[B], at 4-45.
57. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
58. Daily Herald I, 758 F.2d at 358.
59. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 384.
1989)
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
based statute that regulates speech in a public forum will be examined
with a higher level of scrutiny than a content-neutral statute.
6
0
The Supreme Court has not provided a precise definition of the pub-
lic forum doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court has elaborated on locations
that it considers as traditional public forums. In Hauge v. CI Q.,61 the
Court discussed the public forum doctrine. 62 The issue in Hauge was
whether a municipal ordinance forbidding all public meeting in the
streets and other public places without a permit was constitutional.63
Justice Roberts wrote:
Wherever the title of the streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing pub-
lic questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets and parks for communication of
views on national questions may be restricted in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in sub-
ordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in con-
sonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise
of regulation, be abridged or denied.'
In United States v. Grace,65 the Supreme Court held that
"[t]raditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms
of the First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically rec-
ognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that
had been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expres-
sion. '' 66 In Grace, appellees, Mary Grace and Thaddeus Zywicki, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of 40 U.S.C. section 13(k) which prohibits
the "display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring
into public notice any party, organization, or movement" in the United
States Supreme Court building or on its grounds. 67 They sought an in-
junction against enforcement of section 13(k) and declaratory judgment
60. Id.
61. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
62. There was no majority opinion in Hauge. However, Justice Roberts wrote a concur-
ring opinion joined by Justice Black.
63. Hauge, 307 U.S. at 506.
64. Id. at 515-16.
65. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
66. Id. at 180.
67. Id. at 172.
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that it was unconstitutional on its face.6" The government argued that
the Supreme Court building and grounds presented a classic illustration
of a non-public forum and, that since the statute was content-neutral and
the restrictions imposed reasonable, it was constitutional.69 The Court
rejected this argument. Justice White wrote:
Included within [the geographical reach of the statute] are not
only the [Supreme Court] building, the plaza and surrounding
promenade, lawn area, and steps, but also the sidewalks. Side-
walks, of course, are among those areas of public property that
traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive
activities and are clearly within those areas of public property
that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be
public forum property.7"
The principles set forth in Grace serve as guidelines for the public
forum analysis. Applied to Daily Herald II, the Washington statute cov-
ers within its three hundred foot restricted zone more public sidewalks
and public streets than the four sidewalks surrounding the Supreme
Court at issue in Grace.7'
The area surrounding the voting polls are public forums since often
the voting polls are located within public schools, post offices, and similar
locations. The voting poll itself is not an issue in Daily Herald because
the Media Plaintiffs admitted that the State may constitutionally limit
their activities inside the polling place.72
Was the Statute a Content-Based or Content-Neutral Regulation?
The distinction between a content-neutral and content-based regula-
tion is that while content-neutral regulations are broad bans on all
speech, content-based regulates subject matter of the speech, allowing or
disallowing the speech based upon its message.
The Supreme Court in Nimotko v. Maryland, 73 held that if a statute
is not content-neutral, governmental action must be scrutinized more
carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited merely
because public officials disapprove of the speaker's view. 74 "The first
amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to
68. Id. at 174.
69. Brief for Appellees at 44, Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
70. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
71. Brief for Appellees at 45, Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
72. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 384 n. 5.
73. 340.U.S. 268 (1951).
74. Id. at 282.
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restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibitions of public
discussion of an entire topic."75
Hence, the courts will employ a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation level of scrutiny only if the speech regulation is content-neu-
tral.76 Otherwise, the courts will employ heightened scrutiny to a con-
tent-based speech regulation.
The Daily Herald II court rejected the State's contention that the
statute was content-neutral.77 The court found that the statute was not
content-neutral because it restricted the expression of certain ideas and
viewpoints. 78 Justice Ferguson held the statute was also content-based
because it regulated a specific subject matter-the communication be-
tween the voter and the pollster.79
Even if a speech regulation is not content-based, so that a strict stan-
dard of review will not apply, a content-neutral speech regulation must
be reasonable in time, place, and manner8 0
In Grace, Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, stated that to be a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation
the regulation must not apply at all times, cover the entire parameters of
the premises or be overinclusive81 The Daily Herald H court, without
analyzing the facts, held that the statute was not a reasonable time, place,
and manner regulation. 2
Applying Justice Marshall's standard to Daily Herald, Washington's
statute was over-inclusive and not limited to express activities defined in
the statute. The statute was not a reasonable time regulation because it
prohibited exit polls on election days; thereby defeating the purpose of
election polls. Further, the statute was not a reasonable place regulation
because it prohibited exit polls within three hundred feet of the voting
polls. Pollsters would be unable to conduct accurate scientific exit polls
from such a distance. Finally, the regulation unreasonably regulated the
manner of poll-taking because it prevented the communication between
pollsters and voters.
75. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Services Comm., 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980).
76. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 386.
77. Id. at 385.
78. Id. at 386.
79. Regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content
presumptively violate the first amendment. See Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 385 (citing City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986)).
80. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 386. See Corenelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
81. Grace, 461 U.S. at 185-86.
82. Daily Herald I, 838 F.2d at 386.
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In addition to disruptive exit polls, the statute limited non-disrup-
tive exit polling.83 Moreover, it did not leave open alternative channels
of communication to gather the type of information obtained through
exit polling.
84
Thus, because the statute was not content-neutral, it regulated
speech in a traditional public forum, and was an unreasonable regulation
on time, place, and manner, a strict level of judicial scrutiny would be
appropriate.
Strict Scrutiny
To be constitutional, a content-based statute that regulates speech in
a public forum must satisfy three requirements: (1) there must be a com-
pelling governmental interest; (2) it must be narrowly tailored to accom-
plish a compelling government interest; and (3) it must be the least
restrictive means available.
In Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York, 5 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Com-
mission's suppression of bill inserts that discussed controversial issues of
public policy. 6 The Court reasoned that political speech must be care-
fully scrutinized to ensure that communication has not been merely pro-
hibited because a political body or government institution opposes a
speaker's view. 87 Finally, the burden of proof rests with the government
to demonstrate that the chosen means of furthering its asserted interest
imposes the least burden on the first amendment activity.88
Compelling Governmental Interest
Behind each statute, a legislature has an interest that it desires to
advance. Even though the interest might advance a state's economic or
social interests, to survive strict scrutiny the interest must be compelling.
In Consolidated, the Commission alleged that the prohibition
against bill inserts was necessary for three reasons: (1) to avoid forcing
Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience; (2) to allocate limited
resources in the public interest; and (3) to ensure that ratepayers do not
subsidize the cost of the bill inserts.8 9 The Court rejected these argu-
83. Id. at 385.
84. Id. at 386.
85. 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
86. Id. at 544.
87. Id. at 537.
88. NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984).
89. Consolidated, 447 U.S. at 540-41.
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ments. The Court held that mere speculation of any of these harms is
not a compelling governmental interest. 90
In Daily Herald I, Judge Norris stated that the Media Plaintiffs ad-
mitted that the State had a legitimate interest in preserving peace, order,
and decorum at the polling places.9 However, in Daily Herald II, the
court held that even though the State argued that the purpose was to
preserve "peace, order, and decorum" around the polls, the true purpose
of the statute was to inhibit the broadcast of election projections, which
was not a compelling government interest. 92 Furthermore, even if the
interest was compelling, the statute was not narrowly tailored.
93
Further, even if the State's true purpose was to preserve peace, or-
der, and decorum at the voting polls, the State failed to meet its heavy
burden of proving a compelling governmental interest. The State did not
factually support its contention. Moreover, subsection (1)(d) of the same
statute already limited disruptive exit polling. As in Consolidated, mere
speculation to election poll impact on voting is not a compelling govern-
mental interest.
Narrowly Tailored to Further a Compelling State Interest
A statute is narrowly tailored to advance a governmental interest
when the regulation does not regulate any other subject area other than
the original governmental interest. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court elaborated on whether
an executive order excluding a Legal Educational Fund from participa-
tion in a charity drive aimed at federal employees and military personnel
was constitutional. The Court held that individuals can be excluded
from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a com-
pelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest.94 Hence, state or federal legislatures must ensure that the regu-
lation achieves only the purported governmental interest. Otherwise, a
regulation may be overinclusive and unnecessarily overbroad.
In Daily Herald, the State contended that the interest of the State is
in "safeguarding the most important right that citizens enjoy, the right to
vote free from political annoyance and disruption." 95 The court con-
cluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to advance this
90. Id.
91. Daily Herald , 758 F.2d at 359.
92. Daily Herald 11, 838 F.2d at 387.
93. Id. at 385.
94. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
95. Brief for Appellants at 27, Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
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interest.
96
In analyzing the Daily Herald court's conclusion, even if the pur-
pose of the statute was to prevent disruptions at polling places by pre-
serving "peace, order, and decorum," the statute was not narrowly and
precisely drawn to further "peace, order, and decorum" because the
state permitted one, ten, or twenty people to stand about a polling place
and conduct "interviews" of voters, but prohibited even one pollster
from engaging in an exit poll. 97 For example, there was evidence at the
trial that journalists or interviewers could remain within the prohibitory
limit all day, but the same reporters were prohibited from conducting
exit polls.98 In fact, the court recognized that even if the State's interest
was to prevent disruption at the polling places by restricting exit polling,
the statute was not narrowly tailored since it prohibited non-disruptive
exit polling.99
Similarly, if the purpose of the statute was to prevent the broadcast-
ing of early returns, the statute was not narrowly tailored since it prohib-
ited poll taking even for those who do not broadcast poll results. For
example, the regulation prohibited newspapers, which do not use exit
poll data to make election day projections."° Further, scholars have
used exit poll data to study and report on the American electoral pro-
cess.101 Hence, exit polls aid political scientists and election scholars to
study the relationship between a person's characteristics and voting
patterns.
Least Restrictive Means
The means used to advance a state interest are least restrictive when
the means are the least intrusive upon the interest or right in question.
Hence, even if the legislative purpose is compelling, "that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breath of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achiev-
ing the same basic purpose."'
' 0 2
The State in Daily Herald contended that it had chosen the least
restrictive means to advance its interests. However, the Daily Herald II
96. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 385.
97. Brief for Appellees at 37, Daily Herald I1 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
98. Id.
99. Daily Herald I 758 F.2d at 361.
100. Id. at 357.
101. Id.
102. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
1989]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
court believed that there were several other less restrictive means of ad-
vancing the State's interest. The State could have reduced the size of the
restricted area; required the media to explain that the exit poll is com-
pletely voluntary; required the exit polling places to have separate en-
trances and exits; or prohibited everyone except election officials and
voters from entering the polling room. 13
There are several less restrictive means to address perceived disrup-
tion, other than intruding into first amendment rights." For example, if
disruption and confusion were the perceived problem, the State could
have proscribed exit polling that used look-alike election ballot question-
naires and required exit pollers to wear bigger or brighter identification
sashes. 15 In fact, the State already had a less imposing provision aimed
at ensuring that polling places remain free from disruption. 1 6 Washing-
ton Revised Code section 29.51.020(l)(d) specifically prohibits interfer-
ence with voters, obstruction of entryways and any practice or conduct
that disrupts the administration of the polling place."7
In sum, the statute did not serve a compelling government interest
because preserving peace, order, and decorum at the expense of a speech
regulation is not compelling. Even assuming the interest was compelling,
the regulation was neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive
means; the Washington exit polling statute is not only unnecessarily
overinclusive, but is repetitious. The State's claimed interest in prevent-
ing disruption of the polling places is already largely safeguarded by
other statutory provisions.
Alternative Analysis
Notwithstanding the traditional method of analysis, Judge Rein-
hardt, in his concurring opinion, sought to broaden the scope of the
court's holding. Judge Reinhardt contended that not only are exit polls
protected as public forums, but that they are protected because of the
media's right, and more importantly, the right of society to gather and
disseminate information important to the democratic political process. 108
Under Judge Reinhardt's approach not only would the State have a duty
not to interfere with the expressive autonomy of individuals, but the
State would have an affirmative obligation to preserve open and informed
103. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 385.
104. Brief for Appellees at 40, Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
105. Id. at 26, Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d 380 (No. 86-3641).
106. Id.
107. WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 29.51.020 (West Supp. 1984-85).
108. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 389.
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discussions. 1o9
Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion, in Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 1"0 provides support for Judge Reinhardt's position. Brandeis stated:
[Flreedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
the greatest menace to freedom is inert people; that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamen-
tal principle in American government."'
Professor Nimmer identified three main elements to this historic
passage regarding the functional justifications for freedom of expression
in American society. Speech serves as a necessary concomitant of en-
lightenment, as a self-fulfilling activity, and as a necessary safety valve
for the nation. "12
Justice Brandeis believed enlightenment through expression is neces-
sary in order for the populace to make well-informed political deci-
sions."' 3 Without free and open dialogue between voters, an individual
voter may be unaware of the multitude of crucial political and social
issues involved during an election." 4 Without freedom to express one-
self, whether through speech or assembly, candidates for office would be
unable to voice their positions and platforms to the American people. As
a result, the voter would be inert and unable to make a well informed
political decision. 1 15
According to Professor Nimmer, speech also serves as a necessary
safety valve." 16 He wrote that without freedom of expression, an avenue
of discussion, the populace will be prohibited from expressing themselves
legally since the modes of communication would be restricted by the cen-
tral government through various speech regulations." 7 Without a legal
mode of communication, the populace will resort to violent means." 
8
109. Id.
110. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), rev'd Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
111. Id. at 375.
112. Id.
113. NIMMER, supra note 50, § 2.08[E], at 2-121.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. NIMMER, supra note 50, § 2.08[E], at 2-122.
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This function can be exemplified by contrasting countries where speech
and assembly are permitted and countries where speech and assembly are
restricted.
In the instant case, Washington disregards "the profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide open." ' 9 The statute prohibits the right to
gather and disseminate information crucial to the democratic political
process. Without a forum for dialogue, Justice Brandeis' three functional
justifications for freedom of expression would be inapplicable to exit
polls.
IV. COMMENTS
Even if constitutional, a statute regulating exit polls may not neces-
sarily accomplish its goals. If early projection results actually cause
voter apathy in Washington and other western states, the real cause of
voter apathy is the exit polls in states east of the Mississippi. The prob-
lem, if one actually exists, is in the East, and not in Washington.
In stark contrast to the legislature's fears that exit polls may directly
result in apathy, it is quite conceivable that election projection might in-
duce voter turnout. For example, if a large group of American voters
decide not to vote because they believe candidate (A) will easily defeat
candidate (B), and pre-poll closing projection project candidate (B) will
win, the (A) backers who had not voted due to their optimism might go
out and vote for (A). The conceivable result is that (A) will win because
of early projections by the media.
The hypothetical emphasizes why Justice Reinhardt's concurring
opinion should not be undervalued. Our society values public debate of
political issues. The first amendment must protect exit polls because exit
polls function as a framework for free expression on public issues. In
fact, in Bridges v. State of California, 20 the United States Supreme Court
discussed the function of the first amendment's freedom of expression.
The Bridges court reversed a lower court contempt convictions of two
newspaper journalists who made an editorial denouncing two members
of a labor union awaiting trial. 2 ' In a five to four decision, Justice Black
stated: "[T]he likelihood, however great that a substantive evil will result
cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press." '22
The courts have been unwilling to find a substantive evil to justify a
119. Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 389.
120. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
121. Id. at 278.
122. Id. at 262.
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restriction on freedom of speech or of the press. Until data is collected
and analyzed to provide evidence that exit polls cause voter apathy, reac-
tions to the effects of exit polls are premature. The Washington statute
was a restriction to a problem that has not been empirically documented.
The 1988 presidential election might provide information illustrating
that there is an actual cause and effect relationship between exit polls and
voting trends. If so, the states should seriously consider the significance
of the data before acting.
The Daily Herald II court does not adequately discuss the conflict
and tension between the right to vote and the first amendment guarantee
of freedom of expression. Washington's interest in guarding the right to
vote free from potential annoyance and disruption, must be balanced
against the first amendment right to conduct exit polls.
The solution does not lie with the court, but rather within the fed-
eral and state legislatures. Legislatures must extrapolate the principles
enunciated by the Daily Herald II court and resolve the problem by re-
maining within the boundaries of the first amendment.
Finally, legislatures must realize that there are a variety of polls.
Exit polls are but a subset of public opinion polls. News organizations
and political scientists often conduct public opinion polls through either
written questionnaires or telephone calls. If exit polls are singled out for
scrutiny by state legislatures, state citizens should scrutinize their elected
officials for not concentrating on the real solution-uniform poll closing
time.
V. CONCLUSION
What is left after Daily Herald II is but an amalgamation of cases
prohibiting restrictions on speech. Even though election and exit polls
are relatively new forms of speech, state and federal legislatures should
not be short sighted in restricting exit poll use.
The courts, as illustrated by the Daily Herald II court, will be un-
willing to permit legislatures to prohibit the individuals right to obtain
information crucial to the political process and the press' right to gather
newsworthy material.
Ali Soltani
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